The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation :: Gadamer Philosophy Philosophical Essays

The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation scheme This musical composition reexamines the central thesis of Gadamers theory of translation that object glassivity is non a suitable deification for understanding a text, historic withalt or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one position interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make hold the causal agency for this claim, I witness three possible product lines. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically rigid prejudgments. I carry off this parentage as insufficient. I also reject a second crease concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third melody that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to prevail it against deuce objections (i) that it confla tes meaning and logical implication and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. Gadamers theory of philosophic hermeneutics amounts to a sustained argument for a view that one big businessman call anti-objectivism or interpretative pluralism. (1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps some(prenominal)thing at all, objectivity is not a suitable saint because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamers words, understanding is not merely a re arable plainly always a productive personationivity as good (G 280 E 296) it is a fusion of horizons of the historical and present, objective and subjective (G 289 E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer make pass of an anything-goes relativism. In other words, in Gadamers view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of fine- looking up criteria that distinguish correctly ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamers grounds for denying the existence of a unequivocally correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I demoralise by showing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then offer to a third more hopeful argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but rather represent anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller plea for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamers position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knowers situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.The Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of Interpretation Gadamer doctrine Philosophical EssaysThe Relational Properties Approach to a Theory of InterpretationABSTRACT This paper re examines the central thesis of Gadamers theory of interpretation that objectivity is not a suitable ideal for understanding a text, historical event or cultural phenomenon because there exists no one correct interpretation of such phenomena. Because Gadamer fails to make clear the grounds for this claim, I consider three possible arguments. The first, predominant in the secondary literature, is built on the premise that we cannot surpass our historically situated prejudgments. I reject this argument as insufficient. I also reject a second argument concerning the heuristics of understanding. I then articulate a third argument that the object of understanding changes according to the conditions under which it is grasped. I appeal to the notion of relational properties to make sense of this claim and to defend it against two objections (i) that it conflates meaning and significance and (ii) that it is saddled with an indefensible relativism. Gadamers theory of philosophical hermeneutic s amounts to a sustained argument for a view that one might call anti-objectivism or interpretive pluralism. (1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps anything at all, objectivity is not a suitable ideal because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamers words, understanding is not merely a fruitful but always a productive activity as well (G 280 E 296) it is a fusion of horizons of the past and present, objective and subjective (G 289 E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer clear of an anything-goes relativism. In other words, in Gadamers view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of giving up criteria that distinguish right ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamers grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct interpretation of a text, object, or event? I begin by sh owing the inadequacy of two arguments for his position. I then turn to a third more promising argument that objectivity is not possible because the object of understanding is not determinate, but rather constituted anew by each act of understanding. My goal in this paper is to provide a fuller justification for the third argument and thereby defend Gadamers position. I do so by reformulating this third argument in terms of relational properties so as to establish that the knowers situatedness plays, as Gadamer himself insists, a positive, constitutive role in the process of understanding.